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Perhaps, legislation would provide the solution. It is felt, however, that in an area such as this, where it is the over-all effect of a
transaction that determines its treatment, pronouncement through
case law of general principles to be applied and promulgation of interpretive regulations are preferable to any statutory attempt to spell
out the innumerable variations which would result in includibility.
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HELD ABSOLUTELY PRIviLEG.-Petitioner, as Acting Director

of the Office of Rent Stabilization, issued a defamatory press release
regarding suspension of two officers of the department. The release,
which named the officers, intimated that they had acted irregularly
in proposing a leave payment plan. The lower court, in remanding
for new trial, found the press release qualifiedly privileged but refused to grant immunity because of petitioner's malice. Petitioner
requested certiorari on the question of absolute privilege. Held, the
statement was absolutely privileged. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959).
Defamation, an attack upon an individual's good name and reputation, is historically divided into libel and slander. The former includes variously written forms of defamatory matter, the latter
concerns oral statements.1 "Libellous per se" connotes that the existence of damage to a plaintiff is a necessary result of the publication
of the libel. This view also encompasses those publications, which
although not defamatory on their face, require extrinsic facts to
establish their defamatory meaning.2
In a defamation action, there are available to the defendant two
absolute defenses, privilege and truth. The former defense is further
subdivided into absolute and qualified, or conditional privilege.
Etymologically and practically, absolute privilege, conferring immunity 3 on the tortfeasor without regard to his purpose, or reasonableness of conduct, is a complete defense.4 Therefore, it is usually
limited in its availability to judicial 5 and legislative proceedings, 6
1 PROSSER,

TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Id. § 92, at 582.
3 On use of the terms "privilege" and "immunity" see Veeder, Absoltte

Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 CoLUm.
(1909).

L. REv. 463, 467-69

4 PROSSEa, op. cit. supra note 1, § 95 at 607.
5 See generally Veeder, supra note 3.
6 See generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative

and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUm. L. Rv. 131 (1910).
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executive communications, 7 husband and wife communications, 8 situations involving consent of the plaintiff,9 and the nebulous area of
political broadcasts. 10 Qualified privilege is awarded in those situations held to be of intermediate social importance, such as statements
made in the public interest, interest of publisher, a common interest
and reports of public proceedings."
The parties concerned are
usually lesser public officials or private citizens. However, the privilege may be defeated by proof of defendant's
ill will, or lack of
12
proper purpose or reasonableness of manner.
The availability of the defense of absolute privilege to government and judicial officials is founded in the concept of a free democratic government, whose system cannot operate effectively if its
members were to act under constant fear of litigious harassment.
Thus, absolute privilege was accorded early in our history to members of the Legislature, 3 and has been subsequently extended even
to members of legislative committees during the course of their
investigations. 14 The practice of exempting judges from civil liability for their judicial acts was confirmed in 1871.15 Absolute immunity or privilege soon enveloped aspects of judicial trial and inquiry, and quasi-judicial 1 proceedings,
such as testimony of witnesses
6
and exhibits of evidence.
Regarding the executive branch of the government, 17 judicial
adoption of the "absolute privilege" has been more hesitant. It was
not until the landmark case of Spalding v. Vilas -8 that absolute privilege was granted to a member of the cabinet. The Court unanimously
held the Postmaster General's communications via mail to past and
present employees concerning their rights under an Act of Congress,
and an attorney's services relating thereto, as absolutely privileged.
It said:
7 Ibid.
s See Dyer v. MacDougall, 93 F. Supp. 484 (E.D.N.Y.

1950); Springer

v. Swift, 59 S.D. 208, 239 N.W. 171 (1931).
9 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 95 at 613.
10 Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).

Contra, Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).

12 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 95 at 614-25.
12 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.21 at 420 (1956).
13 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 6.
See Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:
Executive and Legislative Proceedings, 10 COLUm. L. Rxv. 131, 134 (1910).

14 Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
ISBradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
16 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), affd men., 275 U.S. 503
(1926); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949); Booth v. Fletcher,
101 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See Brown v. Shimabukuro, 118 F.2d 17
(D.C. Cir. 1949); Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings (pts. 1-2), 9 COLm. L. REv. 463, 600 (1909).
17 Heads of state have traditionally held the privilege. See Veeder, Absolute
Privilege in Defamation: Executive and Legislative Proceedings, 10 COLUm. L.
REv. 131 (1910).
is 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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The act of the head of one of the departments of the government in calling
the attention of any person having business with such department to a statute
relating in any way to such business, cannot be made the foundation of a cause
of action against such officers.1 9
As in the case of a judicial officer, we recognize a distinction between
action taken by the head of a department in reference to matters which are
manifestly or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less
connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or
20
supervision.
The Court was faced with two conflicting interests. On the one
hand, the right of the private citizen to enjoy his good name and
reputation, on the other, the freedom of the head of an Executive
Department, acting within his authority, from fear of a civil suit for
damages, lest such apprehension seriously impair the proper administration of his duties. In resolving the issue in favor of the Postmaster General, the Court said that considerations of public policy,
convenience, and interests of the general public were paramount.

These were the policy considerations, 2 ' then, which influenced the
Court's promulgation of its elastic "within the scope of authority"
test. The dearth of additional Supreme Court cases in the area indicated the ruling to be conclusive. 22 The onus, therefore, of adjudicating other federal privilege cases was borne by the lower courts.
The elasticity of the above test authorized the granting of absolute privilege in cases involving employee's reports to superiors
concerning certain irregularities and recommendations for dismissal,2
committeemen presiding over insanity hearings, 2 4 consular exchanges 2 5 and erroneous applications of the law by the Assistant
Secretary of Treasury in tax matters.2 6 In each of these situations
there was present a specific statute or regulation thereto which en-

19 Id. at 493. (Emphasis added.)
20 Id. at 498.
(Emphasis added.)
21 Ibid.
22 A thorough search reveals that Spalding v. Vilas has been cited in only
three Supreme Court opinions [excluding Spalding v. Dickinson, 161 U. S. 499
(1896)]; Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953); Anti-Fascists
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 139 (1951); Brady v. Roosevelt
Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943). In all instances the Spalding case
was mentioned in support of collateral issues only.
23 Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. Md. 1933) (report by U.S. naval
officer to superiors re civilian); Farr v. Valentine, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas.
1913C 821 (D.C. Cir. 1912) (report by Commissioner of Indian Affairs to
Secretary of Interior) ; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 4 L.R.A. (n.s.) 163 (D.C.
Cir. 1904) (report by Chief of the Record and Pension Office to Secretary
of War).
24 Brown v. Rudolph, 25 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
25 United States ex rel. Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir.
1934).
26 Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934).
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abled the court to find that the parties acted on "matters committed
by law to [their] control or supervision." Because of the statutes
involved in the above cases, the courts granted an absolute privilege
to subordinate government officials. Whereas, heretofore, the privilege was granted to executive officials only. Subsequent cases indicated that a more liberal construction of the Spalding case was being
applied.27 Ultimately, in Cooper v. O'Connor,28 the presence of a
specific enabling statute or regulation was deemed no longer basic in
granting absolute privilege to subordinate public officials. The
touchstone became "action having more or less connection" with his
duties. Thus, if it were found that the individual acted within the
scope of his authority, then that immunity which would be conferred
upon the superior officer of the department would be extended to
include the subordinate official. Citing the Cooper case as authority,
absolute privilege was then granted to a collector of internal revenue, 29
a psychiatrist in official service at a medical center 3o and to a chief
of the dietetic service at a Veterans' Administration hospital.3 1
Two of the more noted cases in this area 32 involved defamatory
statements released through the press. The materials in question were
disseminated at the direction of Cabinet officers to the press, thereby
reaching the general public. Mellon v. Brewer3 3 concerned a letter
originally sent to the President, which was subsequently released to
27

Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ; Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d

769 (D.C. Cir. 1937)
28 99

(per curiam).

F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938), rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 673 (1938), rehearing denied, 307 U.S. 651 (1939). "There
must be necessarily a delegation of authority for such purposes [carrying on
departmental functions]. When the act done occurs in the course of official
duty of the person duly appointed to act, it is the official action of the department; and the same reason for immunity applies as if it had been performed
by the superior officer himself." Id. at 142. It is interesting to note that
judicial notice was taken of the authority of the Comptroller of Currency to
issue rules and regulations regarding the reporting of evidence indicating
criminal violations of the law. Id. at 140.
20 Tinkoff v. Campbell, 86 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Il. 1949).
20 Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952)
(per curiam).
31 Carson v. Behlen, 136 F. Supp. 222 (D.R.I. 1955). Contra, Colpoys v.
Gates, 118 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Here, a United States Marshal's publication of statement explaining his dismissal of certain deputies held not absolutely privileged. "United States Marshals have no such functions (political
and policy-making) ....
It may or may not have been his duty to dismiss his
deputies. It was not his duty publicly to discuss their dismissal or publicly to
explain the reasons for it. He had no duty to tell the public anything about
them, unless possibly the bare fact that they were no longer on his staff. In
the cases which have extended an absolute privilege to administrative officers
without policy-determining functions, the thing held to be privileged has usually
if not always been an act in the general line of duty, not a separate discussion
or explanation." Id. at 17.
32 Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S.
530 (1927); Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
33 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
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the press by the Secretary of the Treasury in refutation to charges by
the plaintiff of misappropriation of funds. In finding that the defendant enjoyed absolute privilege, the court declared that the integrity of the Department necessitated such publication. 34 In Glass v.
Ickes,3 5 a press release was issued by the Secretary of the Interior
and directed primarily to those whose representative rights before the
Federal Tender Board were imperiled by services of an attorney temporarily barred from practice before said Board. This release was
held to be absolutely privileged. The court stated that the Secretary's
action was proper and intimated that it was essential.3 6
The present case 3 7 presents the question: Should absolute
privilege be extended to policy-making officials who are not of Cabinet
or equivalent rank? Here petitioner's duty was not authorized by
any specific statute or regulation, nor was petitioner's office under the
supervision of a particular member of the Cabinet, thus bringing his
case squarely within the holding of Cooper v. O'Connor. Petitioner
Barr was Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization at the
time he issued his reasons for respondents' suspension.38 Petitioner
alleged that the respondents' actions had discredited the entire agency,
thereby provoking congressional criticism as well as press inquiry.
Matteo and Madigan brought an action for libel, which was ultimately
defeated by the Supreme Court's finding of absolute privilege.3 9
Petitioner held his office by re-delegation of authority conferred
by statute upon the President. Barr's actions did not have statutory
authorization. But four justices, in declaring that the press release
statements were absolutely privileged, found that petitioner's peripheral actions required a balancing of interests. 40 In the public interest,
34
35

Id.at 171.

117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940).

36 Id. at 280.

Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Petitioner's appointment as Acting Director was not
effective until four days after he issued the statement. Prior to that time
he, officially a Deputy Director, occupied the position by designation of the
37

38 Id. at 565 n.1.

retiring Director, then absent from the city. Therefore, petitioner's act of
suspension would be subsequent to his statement, rather than antecedent. Ibid.
39 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). It is interesting to note that
Matteo's and Madigan's plan for redistribution of certain moneys allotted the
agency was judicially held not to be in violation of the law. Id. at 566 n.3. The
Court in extending absolute privilege to lesser officials makes two statements:
"We do not think that the principle announced in Vilas can properly be
restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank, and in fact it never has been
so restricted by the lower federal courts...." Id. at 572. (Emphasis added.)
"It is not the title of his office but the duties with which the particular officer
sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted-the relation of the
act complained of to 'matters committed by law to his control or supervision' . . .." Id. at 573. It is interesting to note that respondents appealed
Barr's action to the Director of Economic Stabilization (Barr's superior at
the time) by whom they were ultimately reinstated. Id. at 583 n.10.
40 Id. at 574. The test the Court used to answer the question is negatively
framed. "The question is a close one, but we cannot say that it was not an
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a policy-making official, such as petitioner, should enjoy the privilege.
The Court summed up its reasoning by saying that "the concept of
duty encompasses the sound exercise of discretionary authority." 41
Mr. Justice Black concurred, on the ground that petitioner acted
within the scope of his authority. Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on
the basis that the press release was beyond the perimeter of petitioner's authority.
Perhaps the dissenting opinion of Justices Warren and Douglas
and also that of Mr. Justice Brennan present a sounder appraisal of
the problem. It has been submitted that the proposed test embodied
within the Court's opinion may require in each case an evaluation of
the position of the officer and the duties of his office, 42 placing a possible burden on the plaintiff to negate the raising of the defense of
absolute privilege. 43 It would seem a better policy to grant these
officials a qualified privilege for statements to the public, limiting
absolute privilege to those officers appointed by the President or directly responsible to him. The case for qualified privilege is strong.
To overcome a qualified or conditional privilege a plaintiff must
prove that the communication was defamatory, untrue and activated
by actual malice.4 4 Nevertheless, this would construct a strong protective wall about our government personnel in the course of their
official duties, without unnecessarily encroaching upon the rights of
the individual citizen.
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ENTAIL POWER TO TERMINATE TRUST.-Plaintiff-trustees sought a

judgment authorizing the termination of a trust by the payment of
the principal in a lump sum to the beneficiary in order to avoid excessive tax rates. The agreement authorized the trustees to pay from
time to time to the life beneficiary so much of the principal as the
appropriate exercise of the discretion with which an executive officer of petitioner's rank is necessarily clothed to publish the press release here at issue in
the circumstances disclosed by this record." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
41 Id. at 575.
42 "As the Government acknowledged on oral argument, Congress, when it
creates executive agencies, almost never expressly authorizes the new agency
to issue press releases as part of its functions. Nor does it decree which employees of the new agency will have such duties and which will not. By
necessity, therefore, the decision will require a de novo appraisal of almost
every charge of defamation by a government official." Id. at 578-79 (dissenting
opinion).
43 Id. at 579.
44 Id.

at 586.

